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ABSTRACT 
This is a paper based on the annual lecture in honour of Hugo Sinzheimer at No-
vember 10, 2005, Hugo-Sinzheimer-Institute at the University of Amsterdam. In 
1928, Sinzheimer wrote an article entitled “Die Demokratisierung des Arbeits-
verhältnisses,” (The Democratisation of the Employment Relationship). His 
references to unemployment insurance that had been enacted just one year ear-
lier went beyond the participation of trade unions and employers in administration 
as an essential element of democratization. Sinzheimer put even more emphasis 
on another aspect of democratization, namely, the enlargement of the risk-
sharing community to embrace all workers, indeed, the whole economy. The ar-
gument of the paper is that sharing risks through universal and state-guaranteed 
unemployment insurance is still as valid as in the time of Hugo Sinzheimer. There 
is no reason to roll back the welfare state. On the contrary, there are strong rea-
sons to defend the principle of social insurance. By combining a kind of work-life 
insurance with soft forms of governance, this principle—that of “sharing risks”—
can even be extended to include the new risks related to critical events during the 
life course. The argument is developed by answering the following questions: 
First, what are the new risks to which established insurance systems have to re-
spond? Second, what are the advantages of social insurance compared to 
private savings? Third, how should we share for example the risks related to par-
enting and to continuing education and training? Fourth, how do we overcome 
risk-aversion to stimulate more individual risk-taking and thereby more responsi-
bility? 
 
  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Dieses Papier basiert auf der jährlichen Vorlesung zu Ehren von Hugo Sinzhei-
mer am 10. November 2005, Hugo-Sinzheimer-Institut der Universität 
Amsterdam. Sinzheimer schrieb 1928 einen Artikel über “Die Demokratisierung 
des Arbeitsverhältnisses”. In diesem Artikel hob er nicht nur die Beteiligung der 
Sozialpartner an der Verwaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung, die gerade ein 
Jahr zuvor in Kraft getreten war, als einen Fortschritt der Demokratisierung her-
vor. Vielmehr betonte er einen anderen Aspekt der Demokratisierung, nämlich 
die Erweiterung der Risikogemeinschaft auf alle Arbeiter, ja auf die gesamte 
Wirtschaft. Das Argument dieses Papiers ist, dass eine universelle und staatlich 
garantierte Arbeitslosenversicherung nach wie vor gültig ist wie zu Zeiten Hugo 
Sinzheimers. Es gibt keine Gründe, den Wohlfahrtsstaat zurückzufahren. Es gibt 
sogar Gründe, das Prinzip der Sozialversicherung auf neue Risiken des Arbeits-
marktes auszudehnen. Durch die Kombination einer Art Arbeitslebensver-
sicherung und weicher Formen von Steuerung kann das Prinzip solidarischer 
Risikoteilung auch auf die Einkommensrisiken im Zusammenhang mit kritischen 
Ereignissen im Lebenslauf angewendet werden. Dieses Argument wird durch die 
Beantwortung folgender vier Fragen entwickelt: Erstens, welches sind die neuen 
Risiken, auf die etablierte soziale Sicherungssysteme zu reagieren haben? Zwei-
tens, welche Vorteile hat die Sozialversicherung gegenüber privatem Sparen? 
Drittens, wie sollen beispielsweise die Risiken im Zusammenhang mit Eltern-
schaft und beruflicher Weiterbildung geteilt werden? Viertens, wie kann der 
verbreiteten Risikoaversion begegnet werden, um individuelle Risikobereitschaft 
und damit verbundene Verantwortung zu stimulieren? 
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1. Introduction 1
For a political economist it is both a great honour and a great risk to give the 
Hugo Sinzheimer lecture. Most of my predecessors have been experts in labour 
law or law sociologists. Neither my discipline nor the title of my lecture seems 
even remotely related to the work of Sinzheimer. I hope you share this risk with 
me. 
When I accepted the invitation, I had no idea how to refer to the exceptional man 
after whom this institute is named. But an earlier experience gave me confidence. 
When I wrote an article for the volume Reflexive Labour Law, which was edited at 
this institute by Ton Wilthagen and Ralf Rogowski,2 I could easily refer to an im-
portant insight by Hugo Sinzheimer. He stated that the regulation of the labour 
market would be more efficient if parts of this complex task were delegated to the 
social partners, that is, governed by self-regulation. I was therefore sure that the 
broad range of topics that Sinzheimer had thought about would help me again. I 
was even persuaded that Sinzheimer would put me on the right track and enrich 
my story. 
So, when the vague idea for my presentation became clearer, I screened Sinz-
heimer’s impressive list of publications. It did not take long to find what I was 
looking for. In 1928, Sinzheimer wrote an article entitled “Die Demokratisierung 
des Arbeitsverhältnisses” (The Democratisation of the Employment Relationship) 
(Sinzheimer 1976 [1928]). His references to unemployment insurance that had 
been enacted just one year earlier went beyond the participation of the trade uni-
ons and employers in administration as an essential element of democratization. 
Sinzheimer put even more emphasis on another aspect of democratization,  
                                            
 1 Paper based on the annual lecture in honour of Hugo Sinzheimer at November 10, 
2005, Hugo-Sinzheimer-Institute at the University of Amsterdam. I am very grateful to 
Els Sol and Robert Knecht for giving me the chance to hold this lecture. I thank also 
all participants in the lecture for their interest, especially to those who provided valu-
able comments or asked critical questions. From the discussion it turned out that the 
risk perspective of the employers is not yet properly given due attention. Since I was 
unable to correct this deficit already in this version, it will remain as a challenge to fur-
ther the improvement and extension of the concept of social risk management 
through transitional labour markets. I am also grateful to The Netherlands Institute for 
Advanced Studies (NIAS) for giving me the opportunity to write this paper, and to An-
thony Atkinson, Els Sol and Ralf Mytzek-Zühlke for comments on an earlier version. 
Finally, many thanks go to David Antal for his meticulous way to improve my English, 
and last but not least to Dorit Griga and Jutta Höhne for invaluable research assis-
tance.  
 2  See my article with Ralf Rogowski (1994), “Flexibilization of the Labour Market 
Through Law.” 
 
 namely, the enlargement of the risk-sharing community to embrace all workers, 
indeed, the whole economy. 
Let me convey the nucleus of my story by quoting Hugo Sinzheimer: 
„Denn die den Rechtsanspruch auf Arbeitslosenunterstützung gewährleistende 
Arbeitslosenversicherung hat höheren Sinn und Zweck als ausschließlich den 
der Bewahrung des einzelnen Arbeitslosen vor Hunger und Not. Sie schützt 
nicht nur den Arbeitslosen selbst, sie schützt auch den Arbeiter im Betrieb vor 
Verschlechterung der Arbeitsbedingungen; sie fängt die Rückschläge sinkender 
Konjunktur auf, weil sie die Rückzugslinie bildet, die einer wirtschaftlich ge-
schwächten Arbeiterschaft den Widerstand gegen schrankenlose Ausnutzung 
des Konjunkturrückgangs ermöglicht. So schützt sie als lohnerhaltendes Ele-
ment die Arbeiterschaft. Aber sie schützt auch die gesamte Volkswirtschaft vor 
planloser Vernichtung der Kaufkraft.“3
To summarise this passage in my own words, the nucleus of the story is that 
sharing risks through universal and state-guaranteed unemployment insurance is 
still as valid as in the time of Hugo Sinzheimer. There is no reason to roll back the 
welfare state. On the contrary, there are strong reasons to defend the principle of 
social insurance. By combining a kind of work-life insurance with soft forms of 
governance, this principle—that of “sharing risks”—can even be extended to inc-
lude the new risks related to critical events during the life course. 
Defending the principle of social insurance is not fashionable these days. Howe-
ver, I hope to persuade you otherwise by answering the four following questions. 
First, what are the new risks we are talking about? Second, why do we need so-
cial insurance against these risks? Third, how should we share, say, the risks 
related to parenting and to continuing education and training? Fourth, how do we 
overcome risk aversion to stimulate more individual risk-taking and thereby more 
responsibility? I draw my conclusions in a summary at the end of this lecture. But 
first let us explore each of these questions. 
2. The Evolution of New Risks in the Modern Labour 
Market 
In the stylised traditional labour market, women worked for a while after educa-
tion, left the labour market when they got married and perhaps went back for 
some occasional work when their children had grown up. Men entered the labour 
market and worked full-time throughout their lives, possibly with the same 
employer; received a family wage, an income that rose steadily with age; and 
possibly experienced brief intervals of joblessness, which unemployment insu-
rance covered. Labour market related risks were shared among men and 
                                            
 3  Sinzheimer (1928/1976), Vol. 1, p. 132. 
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 governed by the state or trade unions organised as industrial risk communities 
(see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The Traditional Labour Market 
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This picture has changed dramatically. In the modern labour market, the male 
breadwinner model is eroding. Work organisation predominantly based on manu-
factured mass production is shifting to services organised in many cases as 
projects pursued through changing networks. Men and especially women expe-
rience an increasing number of risky transitions between various employment 
statuses for which traditional insurance systems provide only incomplete social 
protection, if any at all. Let me briefly recapitulate the character and some evi-
dence of the three most important new risks (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: The Modern Labour Market 
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 2.1 The changing face of education and training risks 
If we take the European Employment Strategy’s main goal of full employment, 
namely, to reach an employment rate of 70 percent by 2010, then the breakdown 
by qualification immediately shows where the main problem lies. Highly skilled 
people surpass the benchmark of 70 percent by about 15 percentage points re-
gardless of the kind of welfare regime involved. It is the low skilled people whose 
opportunities for participation in the labour market are seriously compromised. In 
The Netherlands, for instance, the employment rate of the low skilled had fallen 
to 58.7 percent in 2003, more than 30 percentage points below the employment 
level of 87.1 percent among the highly skilled (see Figure 3). In Germany the 
corresponding figure was even lower, about 50 percent. 
Figure 3: Employment Rates by Skill Level, 2003 
50.2
59.0
58.7
60.7
58.1
67.5
56.6
54.0
49.8
56.5
72.2
43.9
38.2
37.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Germany
France
Netherlands
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Ireland
Great Britain
Italy
Spain
Portugal
Czech Republic
Poland
Hungary
83,0
82,6
86,5
87,3
81,6
82,2
88,0
86,1
85,8
85,1
85,2
87,1
81,9
82,7
low skill* 
high skill* 
2010: 70 %
 
 (Netherlands and Italy: 2002) 
 
* low skill: less than upper secondary education; high skill: tertiary education 
Percentage of Labour Force Aged 25 to 64 Years 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2005, Table D. 
It is also important to look at the other side of the coin, the unemployment rates, 
which are, unfortunately, not well reflected in the European Employment Strat-
egy. If only the Lisbon Strategy had set the benchmark at halving the 
unemployment rate to about 5 percent by 2010. With a few exceptions, the sta-
tistics show that highly skilled people are already at that level or even below. The 
Netherlands is an example, although the recent development not shown in Figu-
 4 
 re 3 is a bit disappointing to Dutch admirers like me. The picture in Germany is 
much gloomier. In 2003 the unemployment rates of the low skilled averaged 
18 percent (apart from huge regional differences), and those of the highly skilled 
hovered at exactly 5 percent. In most Member States of the European Union 
(EU), however, the benchmark of 5 percent unemployment is utterly out of reach 
for the low skilled (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Unemployment Rates by Skill Level, 2003  
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 (Netherlands and Italy: 2002) 
* low skill: less than upper secondary education; high skill: tertiary education 
Percentage of Labour Force Aged 25 to 64 Years 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2005, Table D. 
Yet the times have vanished when high education was an insurance against low 
income or income volatility over a person’s life course. The risks of proper returns 
from high human capital investments are multiplying but are scarcely reflected in 
current discussion. The high employment and low unemployment rates of the 
highly skilled obscure the fact that these people may also be at risk of falling into 
poverty or avoiding it only at the cost of displacing lower skilled people. It is not 
only that one’s skills may become obsolete because of new technologies during 
one’s life course, it is also the fact that uncertainty is mounting because of market 
globalisation. If an Indian girl in Calcutta receives higher education, she might 
devalue the educational investments of my son in computer science; if your 
daughter invests heavily in playing the violin, a Chinese boy in Beijing might do 
the same and win the musical competition, followed by many more engagements 
due to reputation. As Paul Krugman (1999, p. 203) has noted, the new economy 
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 is not only a knowledge economy but also a celebrity economy. In other words, 
good luck and reputation seem to be determining employment careers and life 
course income more and more.4
The impact of the escalating risks associated with human capital investment re-
turns is twofold and ambiguous. On the hand, it feeds the tendency toward 
credentialing that leads to overinvestment in formal education or training. On the 
other hand, it encourages risk aversion that leads to underinvestment in educati-
on or training, especially among people who gravitate to the low skill labour 
market or among mature-aged people with short employment prospects. 
2.2 Risks related to compressed work careers 
The second concern is the swelling number of precarious jobs in the form of 
fixed-term contracts, temp-agency work or contract work, often disguised as self-
employment. Why is this trend, too, almost uniform in all European Member Sta-
tes? It seems that firms need added internal or external flexibility to adjust to the 
ever more competitive environment and new technologies. However, job protecti-
on is strong in the family-centred employment systems of southern Europe (Italy, 
Spain, Greece) and a bit less strong, but still important, in the conservative or 
corporate employment systems of other continental European countries (e.g., 
France, Germany, The Netherlands). 
Be that as it may, the exceptions to this rule are revealing (Figure 5). In Denmark 
and the United Kingdom (UK), for instance, the share of fixed-term contracts has 
even decreased from an already low level, and dismissal protection is almost 
unknown. Nonetheless, Denmark compensates for the lack of job protection by 
granting generous unemployment transfers combined with strong activation mea-
                                            
 4  There is scattered evidence for this thesis. In the United States, two thirds of the inc-
rease of inequality does not reflect widening gaps between more and less educated 
workers (say, college and high school graduates). Instead, it reflects bigger gaps a-
mong workers with similar education (say, college graduates). People’s earnings now 
fluctuate more from year to year than they used to. In Germany, formal schooling 
explains, on average, only one third of the returns on human capital investment. Wo-
men of age 30 to 39 years have experienced a sharp decline of returns, and at an 
older age (50-60), the returns on education are lower for younger cohorts, particularly 
for women, beginning in 1994 (Lauer and Steiner 2004). A study for The Netherlands 
found that older workers with higher education faced declining wages compared to 
old workers with lower education (wage compression), and intra-group inequality inc-
reased during the 1980s but remained stable during the 1990s (Jacob 2003). Hartog 
(2004) comes closest to the implications of risks related to human capital investment. 
He and collaborators found that higher variance of wages as an indicator of higher 
risks is partially compensated for by higher wages. However, they also found indicati-
ons that these risks are presumably “under-recompensed”, as Adam Smith already 
noted. This circumstance might especially prevent risk-adverse would-be students 
with a low-income background from investing in those risky jobs. 
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 sures, and the UK has been somewhat able to protect against precarious jobs by 
instituting New Deal programmes and successful job-creation machinery.5
Figure 5: Employees in Fixed-term Contracts as a Share of All  
Employees, 1985 and 2003 
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Source: Eurostat New Cronos Databank 
A growing concern is the concentration of precarious jobs among the young. The 
case is especially striking in Germany, where the burden of risks related to fixed-
term contracts lies almost completely on 15- to 25-year olds, and on the young 
adults aged 25 to 35. We know from many studies that fixed-term contracts are 
often useful bridges to regular work. For many young people, though, and in so-
me countries even for the majority, fixed-term contracts are, unfortunately, also 
traps leading to permanently disrupted job careers and often ultimately to social 
exclusion. 
The risks that young adults run as they try to make the transition from precarious 
to stable jobs are often aggravated by “compressed work careers”, the phenome-
non of having to fulfil several social roles simultaneously within a short period of 
working life. It mainly affects young women between 20 and 35 years of age. Sin-
ce labour market participation is becoming the norm for these women, they must 
cope with at least five social tasks at almost the same time: They have to acquire 
                                            
 5  Another factor might be the UK’s successful macro-economic policy for stimulating 
employment growth. 
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 a good education, look for a suitable job, plan a sustainable career, select a sui-
table partner and set up a family at considerable expense in housing and 
furnishings. The way in which work, education and welfare (including the housing 
market) is organised today scarcely helps them master these diverse tasks. Their 
transition to a sustainable career is seriously endangered. 
Even if a woman succeeds in these respects, the accompanying pressures can 
be physically or psychologically disruptive. A study carried out in The Netherlands 
has revealed that the incapacity to work has soared among young women, and 
an Australian research team even speaks of the “excluded generation”. The at-
tention given to this problem where young adults are concerned is relatively little 
compared to what it receives when mature adults are at issue—a serious defect 
in the European Employment Strategy. 
2.3   Risks related to diminishing earning capacities over the  
life course 
Of course, this imbalance is not an argument for discontinuing the efforts to deal 
with the third new risk related to critical events during the life course.  It is the risk 
of the mature adult’s diminishing earning capacity, a decline reflected in their 
employment rates below the full employment benchmark of 50 percent in most of 
the EU Member States. If mature adults become unemployed, they face either a 
high risk of long-term unemployment or the risk of drastically declining wage in-
come. Only about 45 percent of 55- to 64-year olds are employed in The 
Netherlands. However, the situation in that country has improved impressively 
since 1983, unlike the conditions in France and Germany, for example (Figure 6). 
A notable exception is Sweden, where 69 percent of the mature adults are ac-
tively participating in the labour market. Four reasons for this ‘anomaly’ already 
partially support my argument for complementing the social insurance system 
with soft forms of governance. The first reason is that Sweden included mature 
adults in continuing education and training (for example, through the massive 
“knowledge-lift programme” from 1997 to 2002). Second, all monetary incentives 
to retire early have been dismantled in that country. Third, soft forms of govern-
ance have been established through “work-adjustment groups” in Swedish firms 
with more than 50 employees. If work capacity at these firms declines, they have 
to start negotiation and problem-solving procedures to relocate or rehabilitate 
their mature adults. Finally, gender-related differences in mandatory retirement 
(and probably the very institution of mandatory retirement) are out of date. 
Women in Sweden accumulate pension rights independently from the working 
career of their “breadwinning” spouse, an arrangement that Sweden has in com-
mon with Switzerland, among other countries. 
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 Figure 6: Employment Rates of Workers Aged 55 to 64 Years,  
1983 and 2004 
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Percentage of Labour Force Aged 55 to 64 Years 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997, 2005, Table C 
All three risks—education and training, job instability and reduced work capac-
ity—must be considered against the background of eroding internal labour 
markets. From the perspective of risk management, the backbone of internal la-
bour markets has been an implicit insurance contract, with the employer offering 
the male breadwinner a family wage, job security and earnings stability over the 
life course in exchange for the acceptance of wages below the productivity level 
at the peak of the work career. This implicit insurance contract is breaking down 
without a clear alternative in sight yet. 
A plausible conclusion would be to extend the principle of insurance to cover the-
se new risks at least to some extent. But why would it be suboptimal to leave 
people alone with these new risks and to expect solutions through private savings 
or private insurance? Why should we rely on social insurance rather than on pri-
vate savings for these new work-life-risks? 
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 3. On the Advantages of Social Insurance Compared to 
Private Savings 
To answer these questions, we call to mind the basic principle of social insur-
ance. Reflecting on this matter 80 years ago, Hugo Sinzheimer attributed a 
completely new principle of law to social insurance. Social insurance, in his view, 
is not based on private law or individual property rights but on collective law ba-
sed on universal human rights to participate in the production and distribution of 
the society’s prosperity. To ensure that people are not only “free from want” 
(which means having ensured access to basic necessities) but also “free to act”, 
the state is authorised to intervene in property rights and—to put it bluntly—to 
redistribute between those who are lucky and those who are not lucky in the lotte-
ry of natural endowments and the whims of the market.6
There are also macroeconomic arguments for insurance. Let me start with some 
definitions. Social risks—I am not talking about tsunamis, hurricane Katrina, 
earthquakes, or other types of exogenous catastrophes—are likely events related 
to social actions that imply individual losses of calculable probability if they occur 
and gains if they do not occur. Each individual could insure him- or herself a-
gainst these losses by means of savings or precautionary measures. 
In most cases, however, insuring oneself is more costly than pooling risks. Nobo-
dy keeps his own fire brigade; we all contribute to the community fire brigade 
instead. Furthermore, precaution or prevention may become costly and may tie 
up too many resources. For instance, in former times trading ships used to be 
accompanied by convoys to ward off pirates; insurance proved to be cheaper. In 
modern times, many labour markets are heavily regulated to protect against op-
portunistic resignations or dismissals, but it probably turns out that generous 
wage and employability insurance may not only be cheaper but also more equi-
table. I will come back to this point later. 
                                            
 6  In “Wandel im Weltbild des Juristen”, Sinzheimer (1928/1976, Vol. 2, pp. 42-49) as-
serted that the introduction of social insurance created a new type of law, one “no 
longer based on legal capacity to be a subject of legal rights and duties but rather 
also on people’s capacity to make a living” (nicht mehr an Rechtsfähigkeit, sondern 
auch an Existenzfähigkeit der Menschen anknüpft). The principle of property rights is 
complemented by the principle inherent in the rights of humanity, which justify re-
distribution. “The new right intervenes in this redistribution arrangement by 
recognizing rights to share that derive not from property but rather from the fact that 
one is a human being (Das neue Recht greift in diese Verteilungsordnung ein, indem 
es Anteilsberechtigungen anerkennt, die nicht aus dem Eigentum, sondern aus dem 
Menschsein folgt; p. 45). Unlike private law, which is static, the new social law is dy-
namic. It does not aim at regulating legal relations between individuals; it is directed 
instead at social relationships that determine the situation of individuals (p. 48). Be-
cause the new law shapes legal relationships, it is known as reflexive law in modern 
terminology. 
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 If the risks are individually unrelated and distributed equally by chance, the poten-
tial losses can be privately insured. The insurer thereby organises redistribution 
between those hit by the cost-causing event and those not hit by it. Ex ante—that 
is, before anyone knows who will be hit, before the veil of ignorance is lifted—
insurance is a co-operative game of sharing risks. Ex post, after that veil has 
been lifted, insurance is redistribution from the lucky to the unlucky. If the insu-
rance is effective, it establishes a win-win game. 
To be efficient and equitable, however, insurance has to meet some conditions. 
The three most important ones are well known: no moral hazard, no adverse se-
lection, and no correlation of the risks. If risks are correlated or even infectious, 
as with unemployment, no private insurance can guarantee liquidity high enough 
to compensate for the losses. If risks are unequally distributed, bad risks would 
tend to overcrowd and good risks would tend to opt out. As a consequence, 
either bad risks would have to pay deterrent high premiums, or private insurance 
will not be established. If moral hazard exists and is difficult to detect for informa-
tional asymmetries, then control has to be exercised by legitimate power over 
which private insurers normally do not dispose. 
These are the reasons why no civilised country has private unemployment insu-
rance that sufficiently covers the risk of involuntary unemployment. Only the state 
can guarantee liquidity in the event of correlated risks. Only the state can force 
good risks to participate in the insurance or alleviate the burden of premiums for 
the bad risks. Only the state can ultimately exercise legitimate control over moral 
hazard. 
However, if we argue for a wider application of the insurance principle, we have 
to go beyond the risk of unemployment. We have to ask why the welfare state in 
effect provides or organises risk-sharing for many more life-course risks than it 
does for involuntary unemployment. Even liberal welfare states have some kinds 
of mandatory social insurance—such as those against the risks of low income 
(poverty), illness, disability, work accidents, and old age. They at least play a 
strong regulatory role in supervising or supporting various kinds of private insu-
rance. 
The few mainstream economists who dare to deal with this question agree that 
the welfare state plays an indispensable role as a risk-sharing institution.7 Why? 
First, social insurance can enhance efficiency by stimulating otherwise risk-
averse people to engage in prosperity-enhancing activities. Historical examples 
abound. In fact, Peter Bernstein argues in his stimulating book Against the Gods 
(1996) that it was the invention of insurance that propelled modern capitalism. 
The rise of Venice to become the world’s richest city in the 14th and 15th centuries 
would have been inconceivable without the invention of a modern insurance sys-
                                            
 7  The best references, in my view, are Agell (1999, 2002), Atkinson (1991, 1999), Barr 
(2001) and Sinn (1995, 1996). 
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 tem.  Henry Ford once said that New York would not have been built without the 
help of the insurance system. 
Apart from traditional arguments concerning market failure, political economists 
provide additional important reasons for universal and at least publicly ensured 
risk-sharing institutions. Hans-Werner Sinn (1996, pp. 263–264) especially stres-
ses the timing problem related to risks over the life course. Typically, private 
insurance companies deal only with contingent risks that affect clearly distinguis-
hable groups of people. Such risks include the risk of fire, theft, or traffic 
accidents. They are not correlated with a person’s lifetime. Social insurance, by 
contrast, is an all-inclusive insurance that protects against multiple and interde-
pendent risks of lifetime careers. The insurance provided by the public tax and 
transfer system is an insurance against the randomness of career opportunities 
and in nature’s lottery of innate abilities. Because of time dependencies, private 
insurance contracts would have to start right at the beginning of human life, may-
be even with conception. How should a private insurer determine the premiums 
and the indemnities for such complex and interrelated risks? Only public social 
insurance can deal with this time problem, and it will probably be much cheaper 
than private insurance given that a system of fiscal taxation is considered inevi-
table anyway. 
Tony Atkinson (1991) hints at another important reason for the advent of social 
insurance, one that cannot be explained by the traditional economic focus on 
information asymmetries and adverse selection. It is the distinction between risk 
and uncertainty, which harks back to the classic work by Frank Knight (1921). 
When social risks cannot be calculated, no private insurance can do the job of 
compensating for severe and irreversible damages. Faced with uncertainties 
such as wars, riots, epidemics, demographic imbalances, large-scale accidents, 
and other unforeseeable challenges, social insurance contracts have to be flexib-
le enough to mobilise quickly the resources to mitigate such risks and cope with 
them.8
Jonas Agell (2002) adds another important argument. Proponents of rolling back 
the welfare state should be aware that social insurance did not develop mainly as 
a rent-seeking behaviour of interest groups but as substitution for the erosion, 
weakness or even disappearance of traditional self-insurance institutions such as 
the extended family, the “hinterland” of small farms providing economic sub-
sistence, the neighbourhoods, and the communities or trade unions organising 
mutual self-help. The shift to universal social insurance systems occurred espe-
cially in countries exposed to rapid structural change and characterised by a 
relatively homogeneous population. 
                                            
 8  The Contergan case at the end of the 50s and the beginning of the 60s (also known 
as the scandal caused by Thalidomide) might serve as an instructive example of such 
internal social risks that cannot be calculated. 
 12 
 Agell (2002) also suggests functional equivalents as second- or third-best soluti-
ons if tax-financed universal social insurance is not feasible. In addition to 
insuring against the hazards of volatile wages directly through minimum-wage 
laws or unemployment insurance, there are also indirect ways narrowing and 
stabilising wage distribution by means of centralised wage bargaining.9 He uses a 
formal model to show that the insurance benefits from a small compression of the 
wage structure will outweigh any costs in terms of unemployment and reduced 
output. Furthermore, surveys persistently report that the state and collective soci-
al insurance systems are politically accepted, even strongly supported. The 
representative worker is willing to accept a lower expected wage in exchange for 
a wage structure that offers insurance against the uncertainty of who will be in the 
wage distribution. 
Of course, there is a trade-off. On the one hand, people protected by the welfare 
state engage in risky and profitable activities that they otherwise would not have 
dared to undertake. Risky occupations might not be chosen without the protection 
of the welfare state, and it would be difficult to find entrepreneurs willing to under-
take risky investment if debtor’s prison were all that society provides should the 
venture fail. On the other hand, the welfare state may, in fact, make people too 
eager to jump, to become careless, and to take excessively dangerous short-cuts 
in the mountainous paths of life (Sinn 1996). This is the moral hazard to which an 
overwhelming majority of policy advisors call attention. 
How to balance productive risk-taking by avoiding careless risk-taking and its 
moral hazard in a way that maximises efficiency and equity is an old conundrum 
of welfare state theory. In any case, risk-taking has important repercussions for 
the observable degree of inequality in the economy. If people choose more risks 
ex ante, they will typically be more unequal ex post. Risk-averse societies may 
exhibit relatively little inequality but also little economic dynamism. By contrast, 
risk-taking societies may indeed exhibit high economic income on the costs of 
high inequality, as the liberal U.S. regime seems to show. Denmark, however, 
has recently received increasing applause for its achievement of high risk-taking 
and low inequality both before and after taxes—the “flexicurity” model par excel-
lence.10 It therefore does not seem that social insurance necessarily drives the 
“big trade off between equality and efficiency” (Okun 1975); under certain cir-
cumstances it may well also drive a “virtuous marriage between equality and 
efficiency” (Schmid 1994). The question of how such a complementary relations-
hip might work shall be tackled in the next step. 
                                            
 9  In addition, totally flexible wages would aggravate cobweb-like (and therefore quite 
instable and costly) adjustments to external shocks (see Arrow 1971, for example). 
 10  See Auer (2000) and Madsen (2005), for instance. 
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 4. Application of Risk-sharing to New Social Risks 
These general foundations of the “traditional” welfare state are not yet sufficient 
to argue for a further extension of social insurance simply because new risks are 
emerging. What is it that leads me to say that the new risks I have mentioned are 
best covered through an extension of the social insurance principle or, as a se-
cond-best solution, through a revitalisation of self-insuring organisations such as 
collective wage bargaining? The argument shall be developed for two critical 
transitions over the life course: first, for the risks related to parental leave or to 
the combination of parenting and labour market work; and, second, for the risks 
related to educational or training leaves or to models for combining them. 
4.1 Sharing risks related to parenting 
What are the social risks related to parenting? The social construction of risks is 
clear in this area. The time problem already mentioned is best understood from 
the perspective of parents-to-be because for them the veil of ignorance has not 
yet been lifted. These parents do not know which abilities their children will be 
endowed with. They may fear that their children will suffer from illness and inju-
ries. They may worry about bad teachers and friends. They are concerned about 
missing job opportunities and bad choices. They are afraid that their children may 
become unemployed, and they hope, but cannot be sure, that a successful mar-
riage will be possible. 
It is inconceivable that private insurers could cover these risks. They could do this 
only under the condition of contracts that would come close to bondage—as 
Hans-Werner Sinn (1996, p. 263) starkly put it. It would have to be acceptable for 
parents to allocate substantial portions of their children’s future incomes to priva-
te institutions without their offspring having the chance to nullify or even modify 
the decision when they become adults. Private insurance contracts would there-
fore have to wait until a person comes of age, but by then most of the veil of 
ignorance would have been lifted. When both the insurer and the insured have 
the same knowledge about the inequalities then existing they will not be able to 
find mutually agreeable redistribution contracts. And when the insured person 
has superior knowledge, the typical adverse selection problem will exist. 
In fact, the solution may be even simpler than this overly sophisticated economic 
talk. Children are wonderful. Their risks cannot be calculated, and uncertainty 
cannot be insured privately. The solution for the lifetime risks of children can only 
be the family as an insurance device, or—if families are poor or family relations-
hips become unstable—the state. The welfare state cannot eliminate these risks. 
But by offering a redistributive social contract between successful and unlucky 
children, it can help mitigate the consequences. All welfare states therefore offer 
more or less social protection against child poverty, equal access to primary and 
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 secondary education, and health and disability insurance. However, new risks 
arise, and that circumstance has much to do with endogenous changes related to 
values, families and labour markets. 
Let us examine value changes first. As long as the role (that is, the responsibility) 
of parenting is socially ascribed to women, child-bearing and child-rearing is not a 
risk that goes beyond the boundary of the family. However, as soon as it is ac-
cepted that both men and women should have the free choice of engaging in this 
task and that both should have the opportunity to earn their own income, caring 
for children involves a career risk as well as an income risk for both parents. A 
science fiction novel even went so far as to imagine conception being randomly 
distributed between men and women. In a way, of course, this idea is seriously 
misplaced, for most children are consciously planned. However, if you accept the 
thought experiment and imagine that men can also become pregnant, then you 
would probably agree that the debate about the compatibility of family work and 
labour market work would change drastically. Men would certainly be much more 
open for the concept of social risk-sharing related to parenting.11
I now turn to family and labour market changes. When children enter the world, 
not every one of them is hit by the related risks in the same way as all the others. 
Whether and how much men or women are affected depends on the employer, 
the occupation, the working tasks, the neighbourhood and so on. All these factors 
are ones that individuals normally cannot determine or predict. Some people, 
such as academics and people living in intact families or functioning neigh-
bourhoods, can manage to combine market work and family work more easily 
than others. Some of these others, such as those who cannot work at home, tho-
se who must live in broken families, or those who are not integrated into a 
functioning neighbourhood, are less fortunate. Furthermore, the number of single-
parent families is climbing in almost all modern welfare states and thereby exa-
cerbating the vulnerability of children and single parents alike. 
The lack of social insurance against these new risks will lead to two kinds of pe-
nalties: wage and career penalties on the one hand and social penalties on the 
other. The calculated average risk of wage penalty incurred by, say, five years of 
full-time leave amounts to 1.5 to 2 percentage points yearly. The wage penalty 
declines to 0.5 percentage points if only part-time leave is taken, and it differs 
from one employment regime to the next. The wage penalty for interrupting full-
time work is 7 percentage points in conservative regimes (e.g., Germany) compa-
red to liberal regimes with medium public support for employment during the 
family phase (e.g., Canada). This kind of difference likewise emerges in a compa-
rison with social democratic regimes enjoying high public support (such as 
Sweden).12 Such large wage penalties for complete employment interruptions 
                                            
 11  The topic of the “pregnant man” goes far back in history and mythology (see Zapperi 
1991). 
 12  See Gustafsson et al. (2002) and Stier et al. (2001). Complementary results come 
from the varieties-of-capitalism approach. Coordinated regimes are characterized by 
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 can be taken as an argument in favour of publicly financed or publicly provided 
institutions for child care during pre-school and elementary school. They would 
not only broaden the occupational choices of parents (especially women) but 
would pay off economically as well. One must also figure in the risks of status 
loss and restricted occupational choice after expiration of the parental leave.13
The social penalties of inadequate social insurance are no less severe. Whene-
ver children’s lifetime risks are not properly provided for, the lapse will have 
repercussions on the decision to establish a family with children. From this per-
spective it becomes plausible that the welfare regimes with the largest drop in 
fertility rates are those in which life-course securities for children are not properly 
covered. If parents or would-be parents are highly uncertain about how to protect 
against these risks, they will decide against children. The desire to have chil-
dren—an important aspect in the quality of life—will continue to be blocked if the 
future of the would-be parents themselves becomes insecure. Unemployment of 
the parents or of people in their immediate environment is one of the most impor-
tant predictors of low fertility. One piece of evidence for the damaging impact of 
unemployment on family formation, although not a causal relationship in a strict 
sense, is the negative relationship between fertility rates and unemployment ac-
ross OECD countries, in both cross-section and dynamic form (Figure 7). 
Summing up, if we accept the abolishment of traditional role ascription of who 
shall take care of children, we shroud ourselves in the veil of ignorance as desc-
ribed by John Rawls (1990, 2001). Would-be parents do not know where they will 
end up in the lottery of their own careers and that of their children’s careers. Hen-
ce, the structural situation for risk-sharing through social insurance is given, and it 
legitimates redistribution between fortunate and less fortunate parents and their 
children. To the extent that societies value their children, there are strong argu-
ments for inter-generational redistribution and intra-generational redistribution. In 
the inter-generational contract, this would be a generous lump sum to cover so-
me of the immediate costs for children (a non-means-tested child allowance). In 
the intra- generational contract, this would be wage insurance to compensate for 
the risk of reduced earning capacities due to child care.14
                                                                                                                       
higher specific human capital investment, the effect being that the wage penalty of 
employment interruptions is higher than in liberal regimes, where firms do not invest 
much in specific human capital. Correspondingly, wage penalties are generally higher 
for the highly skilled than for the low skilled, whereby the regime types, again, com-
pound the differences (Estevez-Abe 2001, Rosenbluth et al. 2002). 
 13  Of the vast literature on The Netherlands, see Vlasblom and Schippers (2005). 
 14  This arrangement means paying a generous wage replacement of, say, 80 percent 
for up to two years instead of only a small lump sum, which usually leads to parental 
leave being taken by low-income women. 
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 Figure 7:  Fertility Rates and Unemployment in OECD Countries:  
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 In terms of governance, parental risk-sharing as social insurance would have the 
advantage of reducing the fragmented, intransparent and often contradictory 
child-care subsidies that have mushroomed over the decades.15 There are further 
strong arguments for providing tax financed public child-care facilities or at least 
for ensuring affordable public or private child-care services through tax premi-
ums. Finally, there are even strong arguments for introducing take-it-or-leave-it 
paternity leaves to share the risks between men and women equally, as already 
introduced on a small scale in Scandinavia. The other side of the coin, however, 
would be the acceptance of co-financing and the willingness to negotiate solu-
tions to complicated problems of co-ordination between employers and 
employees. 
4.2 Sharing risks related to continuing education and training 
A case for social insurance can also be pressed when it comes to sharing risks 
related to education and training. Take continuing education and training, for e-
xample. Why should the state become involved in sharing risks related to 
deteriorating skills over the life course, to skills lacked by a person who must 
change jobs, or to the uncertainty of returns on investments in human capital? 
Why should these matters not be left solely to individual savings or precautionary 
measures taken by the employers or employees? 
The first reason why the state should involve itself is savings restrictions: The 
people who need continuing education and training most lack the necessary fi-
nancial resources. Numerous studies have shown that the people with the 
greatest need for continuing education and training are especially the ones who 
will not be able to save enough for substantial investments. Apart from the fact 
that participation in continuing education and training varies across OECD count-
ries between 10 and 40 percent of the labour force on average, the participation 
of highly skilled persons is an average of 26 percentage points higher than for 
people with low or only upper secondary skills (see Figure 8). Multivariate studies 
using industry, educational attainment, gender and age to explain participation 
produces a fairly stable result. In most countries, the only significantly positive 
variables are the level of educational attainment and the upper tier of the service 
industry. In a few countries the age group of 55-to-64-year-olds is significantly 
negative (OECD 2005, p. 314). Studies about the reason for non-participation on 
the supply side emphasise financial bottlenecks as important determinants espe-
cially for the low skilled. On the demand side, education and training costs 
decrease for the employers as employee skills improve through higher learning 
capacities and lower risks of failing at training courses.16
                                            
 15  Germany has about 150 such child-care subsidies. 
 16  For facts and figures related to participation and investment in continuing education 
and training, see OECD (2003, 2004, 2005). 
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 The second reason why the state should help shoulder the risks related to educa-
tion and training argument is capital market failure. The market does not loan to 
those who most need credit for continuing education and training.17 Problems 
associated with default make banks reluctant to grant such loans to young or 
mature adults. Unlike a housing loan, an education or training loan has no collat-
eral for the bank to sell if the loan recipient defaults on repayment. The 
implication is that banks will not be interested in underwriting human capital in-
vestments unless at least one of two conditions are met: (a) high interest rates 
with deterrent effects on would-be loaners, or (b) securities from assets other 
than human capital, a demand many candidates for loans cannot fulfil. Prospec-
tive investors without sufficient financial resources or real estate will not be able 
to invest in continuing education and training. This foreclosure has four important 
implications: a loss of talent and, hence, a cost to the whole society; a loss of 
opportunity for individuals; a cementing of inequalities resulting from previous 
disadvantages related to family background and education; and the perpetuation 
of inter-generational inequality. 
Figure 8:  Participation Rates in Formal and Non-formal  
Continuing Education and Training, 2003 in Percentages 
15
21
52
48
56
24
38
37
9
15
14
14
13
8
22
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Germany
France
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Ireland
Great Britain
Canada
Italy
Spain
Portugal
Czech Republic
Poland
Hungary
9
8
12
4
23
25
10
43
39
39
14
14
66
27
38
40
66
74
42
61
50
22
294
4 50
31
41
164
Total
55-64 
(only non-
formal)
Tertiary 
 
Labour Force Aged 25–65 Years 
Source: OECD Education at a Glance, 2005, Tables C 6.1a, C 6.4. 
The third argument in favour of risk-sharing by the state is lack of equity. The 
people who greatly prefer investment in continuing education and training may 
have the weakest position in private household bargaining, even where govern-
                                            
 17  The following reasoning is inspired, among others, by Chapman and Ryan (2005). 
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 ment-assisted bank loans are concerned. Government assistance would have to 
depend on means testing. This approach rests on the assumption that the indivi-
duals involved have equal access to household income, which might not hold for 
young dependent family members or women in a weak bargaining position. This 
condition would, in turn, restrict loan access for those family members who value 
human capital investments more highly than the co-determining family members. 
The greatest problem, however, is default. The risk of inability to repay a loan is 
highest among those with a background of poor income. Experience has shown 
that default rates among such people are very high.18 If government guarantee is 
unlimited, investors will put little care into their choice of investment, and banks 
will put little effort into debt recovery. Default and moral hazard problems can 
make government assistance very expensive for taxpayers. Thus, governments 
will assist only if quite restrictive guarantees are agreed to. In other words, bank 
loans will have to be repaid under normal circumstances. This condition has seri-
ous implications for would-be borrowers. For fear of not meeting future 
repayment obligations, some eligible investors will not be prepared to take bank 
loans. They would also fear damage to their credit reputation and, hence, to their 
future borrowing ability, say, for a house. Consequently, some eligible borrowers 
will not be prepared to take out bank loans. Risk aversion is intensified by the fact 
that returns on continuing education and training investments are particularly un-
certain.19
What are the alternatives? Some countries have experimented with various forms 
of state subsidised individual training accounts, such as individual development 
accounts (IDA), individual learning accounts (ILA) and long-term time-saving ac-
counts (TSA) especially earmarked for education and training. It is too early to 
assess these experiments, but most of them have been failures. Moral hazard or 
even fraud terminated some of them (e.g., the British ILA) in the middle of their 
implementation. Other types of state subsidised individual training accounts were 
even not introduced despite long preparations, as happened in Sweden for fear 
of unbalanced social consequences favouring people who were already well-off. 
Even a panel of experts in the United States came to an ambivalent result after 
studying the idea of complementing social insurance with individual accounts. 
The strongest arguments in favour of such accounts were that they 
 counter-balance the political discretion of purely publicly administrated 
social insurance, 
 encourage individual responsibility, 
                                            
 18  Chapman and Ryan (2005, footnote 10) quote literature reporting 15 to 30 percent 
average default rates for student loans in Australia and 50 percent in U.S. Propriety 
Colleges. 
 19  First, it is unsure that the complex web of factors that influence the returns on continu-
ing education and training can be analytically disentangled. Second, returns can 
materialise quite late in a person’s career, as shown by most of the recent evaluation 
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  allow individual ownership and individual choice, and 
 perhaps discourage tax evasion and increase incentives to participate. 
The strongest arguments against state subsidised individual training accounts 
were that they 
 escalate administrative costs, 
 expose workers to market risks and the risk of poor investment choices, 
 erode the benefit level provided to those with low earnings, 
 undercut the sense of community responsibility and shared concerns em-
bodied in Social Security, 
 entail undesirably large variation in benefits between members of different 
cohorts employing the same investment strategy, and 
 restore actuarial balance in the existing system, an effect that might revive 
worker’s confidence in the future of Social Security. By diverting revenues 
and introducing new risks, individual accounts might not improve confi-
dence in either the remaining defined-benefit portion of Social Security or 
in the overall system. 
In fact, the balance of the pros and cons reflected a fair degree of scepticism a-
bout individual accounts.20 This finding raises the question as to whether 
combining social insurance and elements of individual choice and responsibility 
would be more promising than state subsidised individual training accounts. A 
worthy example is the Australia’s Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(HECS). This income-contingent loan, introduced in 1989 and amended in 1997, 
goes beyond risk pooling, which would be possible to organise privately. It is a 
public-private risk-sharing device for financing higher education. All students are 
entitled to a loan regardless of family income. The debts must be repaid only if a 
stated income threshold is exceeded.21 The issues of default and moral hazard 
are effectively resolved by a government guarantee if default occurs and by re-
payment through the effective governmental tax authorities. New Zealand (1991) 
and the UK (2005) have introduced this kind of scheme, and Thailand follows in 
2006. 
The Australian scheme seems to have been accepted. It does have flaws, howe-
ver. Although HECS was introduced explicitly to improve the share of university 
students from poor family backgrounds, it had no discernible effect on this target 
group. It may have helped expand overall university attendance, but it made only 
the middle class (and perhaps women) better off without making the poor worse 
                                                                                                                       
research on this subject quite late in a career (see Heckman et al. 2002). 
 20  Diamond (1999, pp. 21–24); see also for differentiated view and dampening high ex-
pectations of private social insurance Pearson and Martin (2005).  
 21  For a description and evaluation of the HECS, see especially Chapman (2005) and 
Chapman and Ryan (2005). 
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 off.22 Another problem of the Australian scheme is the political discretion of fixing 
the earnings threshold beyond which the debts must be repaid. After a relatively 
generous threshold set by the labour government in 1988, the conservative go-
vernment lowered the threshold considerably, slashing the implicit subsidy of the 
loans. This discretion is probably the main reason for the mediocre success of 
the programme, for it has created uncertainties that deter the most risk-averse 
students—those from poor backgrounds—from taking out these income-
contingent loans. 
In principle, income-contingent loans could also be used for continuing education 
and training. Apart from the critical points already mentioned, however, practical 
problems exist. Most continuing education and training is piecemeal and ad hoc, 
a characteristic that makes it difficult to attribute rising income to these kinds of 
fuzzy investments. And unlike higher education, which generates overwhelmingly 
general and transferable skills, continuing education and training produces more 
company-specific, less transferable and therefore riskier skills. Thus, one can 
expect employers and employees to share risk or the firm to shoulder all of it. In 
fact, however, we are again confronted with the “Matthew” principle that the peo-
ple who profit most from company-specific training are those who already have a 
strong position within the company or who enjoy overall employability on the la-
bour market. In addition, recent literature shows that company-financed training 
has many more general traits than is usually assumed.23
What about other alternatives to state subsidised individual training accounts? It 
should be clear by now that one-size-fits-all solutions are impossible in this 
complicated area of continuing education and training. The case for sharing risks 
through social insurance does not seem as strong. After all, the externalities rela-
ted to continuing education and training might not be as major as those related to 
primary, secondary and higher education. Market failures related to continuing 
education and training might not be as strong. And risk-sharing between employ-
ers and employees should be assumed in many instances. Nonetheless, 
untapped qualification potentials, looming shortages of skilled labour, and disad-
vantaged groups legitimate state involvement. The involvement of the state can 
take different forms, and there are still second-best solutions through other forms 
of collective insurance. Examples illustrating the range of possibilities shall end 
this section. 
                                            
 22  In economic terms the scheme thus met the Pareto efficiency criterion but not the 
Rawls criterion. The justice theory by John Rawls (1990, 2001) would recommend the 
contrary approach instead: making the poor better off without to making the rich wor-
se off. In Rawls terms, HECS would be justifiable only if the remaining inequality lifts 
everyone’s lot through greater efficiency, which in the present context means impro-
ved growth rates. It may be that HECS meet this criterion, provided that the 
increasing participation in higher education was due to HECS and that it contributed 
to growth. 
 23  There is even evidence that firms use general training as an insurance device. See 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and Feuer et al. (1991). 
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 First, the state can use its redistributive capacity of taxation to ensure a second 
chance for those who were unlucky on the education and training market. This 
reprieve could be a form of financing periodically targeted programmes for lifting 
the overall level of knowledge and competence of the disadvantaged.24 An in-
structive example is the Swedish “Knowledge Lift” (kunshaftsliftet) programme, 
which spent an annual sum of about €350 million on upgrading the knowledge 
and competence of low-skilled employees or unemployed persons from 1997 to 
2002. Applied to The Netherlands, this would amount to a yearly investment of 
about €700 million and 200,000 additional participants in continuing education 
and training. 
Second, the entitlements to unemployment benefits can be “activated” as “social 
drawing rights” in the form of training vouchers or job subsidies. The concept of 
active labour market policy has already extended the insurance principle to those 
unemployed who need education or training in order to find a new job. Job subsi-
dies for the unskilled can thereby be interpreted as employability measures 
because learning on a matched job in a firm is a functional equivalent of formal 
training for this target group.25 The spiralling need for continuing education and 
training would suggest extending the entitlement to vouchers to low skilled 
employees as well if they have accumulated unemployment benefit entitlements 
for a number of years. Denmark and Sweden have long practised this transfor-
mation of unemployment benefits into education-and-training benefits.26
A third alternative to state subsidised individual training accounts is the idea of 
stimulating continuing education and training by means of tax deductibles, in-
cluding tax credits for those who pay little or no tax. Austria, for instance, 
provides 120 percent deductibles for firms investing in the employability of their 
                                            
 24  This approach corresponds to Dworkin’s (2001) theory of justice in which he recom-
mended periodic redistribution to correct for random inequalities in order to make 
access of resources equal. One way of doing so is to impose heavy taxes on non-
invested inherited assets. On the normative foundation of social risk management, 
see also Schmid (2005). 
 25  For the unskilled, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) found substantial positive returns 
related only to firm tenure. They concluded that programmes designed to improve the 
employability of the unskilled by means of general work experience are likely to be 
less successful, at least in Germany, than programmes attempting to match a worker 
with a firm, say, during an initial job subsidy. 
 26  For arguments in favor of vouchers and drawing-right systems, see Supiot (2000, 
2001) and Wilthagen and Rogowski (2002), Both sources provide examples of good 
practice in this area. Supiot defines such drawing rights exactly in the tradition of Hu-
go Sinzheimer—as rights built on the notion of people’s civil status. However, these 
rights relate to rights to exercise liberty, so their use simultaneously implies individual 
responsibility, including the acknowledgment of quantitative (financial) and qualitative 
(social) limits. The quantitative limit in extended risk communities of this sort implies 
the acceptance of fair co-financing. The qualitative limit implies the acceptance of 
coordination in using the drawing rights, usually by way of negotiation and mutual 
agreements, that is, through soft forms of governance. 
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 employees. Another example is deferred taxation of savings accounts related to 
continuing education and training.  
Fourth, collective agreements can include individual training or time-saving ac-
counts, with the state guaranteeing transferability and liquidity of such 
entitlements and funds. Yet another possibility is an agreement on “working time 
reductions” in the form of investment. In this arrangement, employees agree to 
use reduced working time for education and training and thereby share the costs 
with the employers. The state can enter the game—as is often the case in The 
Netherlands—and enlarge the risk community by mandatory extension of such 
collective agreements to prevent cut-throat price competition between compa-
nies.27
Covenants are a fifth alternative to state subsidised individual training accounts. 
As a soft form of governance, covenants seem especially well suited to managing 
the risks of continuing education and training.28 As previously noted, the situation 
surrounding the decision about investing in education or training is characterised 
by great uncertainties. First, there is the uncertainty about the required skills in 
the future training market. Second, the players of the game—employers, employ-
ees and the state as the representative of externalities—do not know beforehand 
where gains are going to accrue and where losses must be incurred. This obser-
vation holds true at the micro- and macro-levels alike. The veil of ignorance—the 
insurance situation—is a given. 
Covenants are written agreements between two or more parties or partners and 
signed by each of them with the understanding that they are committed to coope-
ration for an overarching common goal. In many cases, the state is involved as 
an initiating and co-signing partner. Unlike private or public contracts, covenants 
are voluntary and require no legal framework. Partners thus retain an exit option 
if the risk-taking appears excessive. On the other hand, the agreements also con-
tain voice options regulating procedures to solve problems step by step as they 
arise. Because the balance of costs and benefits for the partners involved might 
change at each step, there must be trust that corrective measures are taken in 
pursuit of the common goal. Such “induced decision-making” through learning-by-
doing, muddling through step by step, and learning-by-monitoring are the essen-
ce of covenants to establish such trust relationships.29
Covenants as public-private partnerships have become rather popular as a poli-
cy instrument, particularly in The Netherlands. There are two reasons for this 
                                            
27  Such extension of collective bargaining agreements (related to continuing education 
and training in this context) is also practised in Germany in the construction industry. 
28  On this point and in the following passages, I rely heavily on the excellent and stimu-
lating papers by Korver and Oeij (2004, 2005). 
 29  On the concepts of induced decision-making, learning-by-monitoring and policy lear-
ning, see also Hirschman (1967, 1995), Sabel (1994, 1995) and Hemerijck and Visser 
(2003). 
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 development: (a) to overcome state failures in regulating complex issues, and 
(b) to close the gaps of inadequate laws that are either not followed properly or 
even circumvented. There are reportedly several hundred such covenants in The 
Netherlands. These agreements pertain to environmental issues, energy-saving, 
educational matters, health care, traffic and transport, housing, and especially 
working conditions. Best practice in continuing education and training is not 
common knowledge yet, but it probably already exists and may be the secret of 
successful local or regional labour markets. It is also likely to evolve, for the ur-
gency of this overarching common goal at all levels of governance is pressing, 
not least in relation to the Lisbon goal of the European Employment Strategy.30
However, it would be a mistake to consider risk aversion only in economic terms. 
Prospect theory, or the psychological theory of intuitive beliefs and choices, tea-
ches us that risk aversion is not only a matter of rational choice that can be 
resolved with the right economic incentives.31 The way that people perceive risks 
greatly determines their daily choices, and utility is not only a matter of income 
maximisation but also of cognitive and emotional relationships. The consequen-
ces of these insights for the management of new social risks will be explored in 
the next section. 
5.   Sharing and Governing Risks under the Lens of Risk 
Perception 
How can risk aversion be overcome in order to induce people to accept more 
risks and the increased responsibility that goes with them? Prospect theory pro-
vides interesting insights to this question. Most people tend toward myopic risk 
perceptions. They overestimate small-scale risks in the foreseeable future, and 
they underestimate large-scale risks that seem to lie far ahead. Most people are 
therefore more apt to buy travel insurance than disability insurance. Most people 
also underestimate the risk of unemployment or the risk of large income loss due 
to the erosion or lack of skills over the life course. 
Another important psychological insight is that losses loom larger than gains in 
risk perception. Most people prefer small certain gains over large uncertain gains. 
That is, they prefer a bird in the hand to two in the bush. Yet most people are 
extremely averse to loss. They do not like to give things away even if the pros-
pect of gain is bright. Psychologists have found that the loss-gain ratio is about 
two to one. It thus makes a difference in perception whether you frame a risk in 
terms of loss alternatives or gain alternatives. 
                                            
 30  See Ferrera (2005) and Kok (2004), among many others. 
 31  See especially Kahnemann and Tversky (2000) and Gigerenzer (2002). For an appli-
cation to labour market policy, see Schmid (2005). 
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 Important conclusions for the design of risk-sharing policy can be drawn from 
these insights. Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1792), one of the founders of probability 
theory and risk management, gives us a clue. As he pointed out, a beggar will not 
give up begging for a workfare job, for he would lose his ability to beg. He has to 
be offered something more.32
This “more”—what could it be? The concept of transitional labour markets (TLM) 
suggests a specific solution to this psychological problem: the extension of the 
expectation horizon through a set of opportunity structures available in the most 
critical events during the life course.33
(1) The first pillar in an extension of the expectation horizon would be the estab-
lishment of new social rights that go beyond employment. I am sure it would be in 
the spirit of Hugo Sinzheimer to extend the employment contract to an employa-
bility contract that includes income and employment risks related to transitions 
between various employment statuses. 
As forcefully presented in the Supiot Report already, these social rights are new 
in content, scope and nature (Supiot 2001). They are new in that they cover sub-
jects unfamiliar to industrial wage-earners: rights to education and training, to 
appropriate working hours, to a family life and to occupational redeployment, 
retraining or vocational rehabilitation. Their scope is also new since they would 
cover not only “regular” wage-earners but also the self-employed; the semi-self-
employed; and temp-agency, contract and marginal workers. They are new in 
nature because they often take the form of vouchers or social drawing rights, 
which allow workers to rely on solidarity within defined and perhaps collectively 
bargained limits when exercising their new freedoms. 
These new securities can no longer be seen as being given in exchange for sub-
ordination (as in the old employment contract), but as the foundations of a new 
freedom to act. They can be considered as active social securities, which go 
hand-in-hand with worker’s initiatives to shoulder the risks of flexible employment 
relationships instead of restricting them. 
(2) The second pillar in an extension of the expectation horizon would actually 
consist of stepping stones and bridges for overcoming critical events during the 
life course. The tendency to overestimate immediate small risks and under-
estimating distant large risks leads people to perceive the risk of being stuck in 
the low-wage sector to be greater than the risk of long-term unemployment result-
ing, say, from being too choosy about the jobs they will accept. Active labour 
market policies, therefore, should not be confined solely to offering jobs and  
                                            
 32  Quoted in Bernstein (1996, p. 119f).  
 33  On the concept and applications of TLM, see O’Reilly et al. (2000), de Koning and 
Mosley (2001), Schmid and Gazier (2002), Schömann and O’Connell (2002), and 
Mosley et al. (2002). For The Netherlands, see especially Wilthagen (2002), Muffels 
et al. (2003) and van den Heuvel et al. (2004). 
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 placing individuals in work. Follow-up measures are required for transforming 
sheer workfare measures into stepping stones to a sustainable job career. 
(3) The third pillar in any extension of the expectation horizon would be psycho-
logical bridges for overcoming asymmetric risk perception. Acceptance of a risky 
new job often requires abandonment of familiar certainties, such as confidence in 
one’s own productive capacities or the reliability of social assistance benefits 
possibly supplemented by a small amount of clandestine employment. 
Among people from a relatively poor background, the psychological dimension of 
risk aversion is compounded by the financial dimension, with the former parado-
xically sometimes being even more important than the latter, as Bernoulli’s 
beggar has already suggested. Motivation studies have shown that poor people 
are especially dependent on the sociability of their peer groups. But training and 
education often imply a change of peer group, particularly when job mobility is 
required. Hence, it might be advisable to arrange group measures instead of indi-
vidualised measures in such cases. 
The financial implication for programme design is to ensure that fall-back positi-
ons are always plainly available. It is therefore important for people from 
financially insecure backgrounds to have the opportunity to try out several jobs 
without benefits being withdrawn immediately if one option does not immediately 
lead to success. Trust in such sets of opportunities rules out workfare strategies 
that rigidly preclude trial and error as a productive job search strategy. For the 
same reason, the implementation of training measures for these target groups 
should also avoid the creation of exaggerated expectations, which can be nurtu-
red, say, when a job candidate is required to pass formal examinations. 
(4) The fourth pillar in an extension of the expectation horizon would be the es-
tablishment and reinforcement of learning communities. Coping with the risks of 
parenting and of education and training have demonstrated the importance of 
uncertainty, including that of family timing, of the needs to care for children, of the 
skills required by the future training market and of one’s position in the wage dist-
ribution after investment. These kinds of uncertainty defy precise advance 
calculation of financial contributions and benefits, for the risks occur only in the 
process of doing. It is therefore necessary to design forms of social contracts that 
make constant revisions possible in order to recalibrate the balance of costs and 
benefits. Social insurance against new risks thus requires soft forms of gover-
nance that allow learning in the process of implementation. 
In reality, we already know many forms of such learning communities based on 
soft law governance. Collective bargaining agreements are relatively traditional 
examples. But looking more closely, we discover that they tend to develop into 
framework agreements that open ways to negotiate flexibilities into their imple-
mentation. The social dialogue and the open method of co-ordination at the 
European level are modern forms of such learning communities. And as previ-
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 ously mentioned, two Dutch researchers have recently drawn attention to cove-
nants as a promising form of learning-by-monitoring (Korver and Oeij 2004, 
2005). 
6. Summary and Conclusions  
What has come out of this long lecture? There are a number of points to keep in 
mind. First, new social risks have evolved from familiar risks not yet well covered 
by unemployment insurance or other insurance devices. They include increasing 
social risks related to human capital investment; increasing risks of job instability 
related to family, care and life-long learning obligations; and increasing earning 
capacity risks due to ageing and new ways of organising work. 
Second, compared to private insurance, social insurance has the great advanta-
ge of keeping the rules of the game flexible. In addition, democratically legitimate 
governments can redistribute ex ante on the basis of social criteria or, to use an 
outmoded term, solidarity. Solidarity is fundamental to social insurance, as ex-
pressed in spirit by Lord Beveridge in his famous 1942 report entitled Social 
Insurance and Allied Services: “The term social insurance”, he wrote, “implies 
both that it is compulsory and that men stand together with their fellows.” This 
notion, of course, is precisely the reason for the fierce opposition to social insu-
rance from neo-liberal quarters. 
Third, if we accept that the practice of ascribing the role of child care solely to 
women has been abolished, we cloak ourselves in the veil of ignorance described 
by John Rawls. Would-be parents don’t know where they will end up in the lottery 
of their own careers and that of their children’s careers. In other words, the struc-
tural situation for risk-sharing through social insurance is given, which legitimates 
redistribution between fortunate and less fortunate parents and children. That 
redistribution could take place, for instance, through generous non-means-tested 
children allowances and wage insurance during parental leave. 
Fourth, sharing risks by applying social insurance principles could also stimulate 
low-skilled young and mature adults alike to increase their participation in conti-
nuing education and training so as to enhance their employability. With proper 
incentives, employers and other regional actors can be brought into the boat 
through, say, income-contingent loans, periodic governmental second-chance 
programmes, tax deductibles or deferred taxes on educational or time-saving 
accounts. 
Fifth, it would be a mistake to consider risk aversion only in economic terms. This 
stance is supported by Sinzheimer’s view of social insurance quoted at the be-
ginning of this lecture. Prospect theory, or the theory of intuitive beliefs and 
 28 
 choices, teaches us that risk aversion is not a matter of rational choice only. It is 
also a matter of cognitive and emotional relationships. Active or activating labour 
market policy still has a long way to go to exploit these insights in an effective 
recalibration of social risk management, especially when it comes to the need for 
new forms of governance through which to implement these policies capably. I 
have argued for a combination of new social rights, such as training leaves and 
training vouchers, and for soft forms of governance, such as negotiated flexibility, 
covenants and open methods of co-ordination. 
The concept of TLM makes suggestions in this direction, and there is some rea-
son for hope that it is receiving more and more attention, especially through the 
ingenious help of my Dutch colleagues and the bold experimental spirit of Dutch 
politics. 
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